







We often observe that democratically-elected politicians adopt unpopular policies. The
 
observations appear puzzling because politicians must seek popularity of the electorate in
 
democracies. This paper argues that the adoption of unpopular policy can be interpreted
 
as the politicians’attempt to create fact. In the existence of electoral uncertainty and the
 
cost of policy change,an incumbent politician wants to restrict a challenger’s discretion in
 
policymaking and makes a future policy favorable to the incumbent by adopting a radical
 
policy that is hard to change. We also offer some comparative statics results and discuss
 
the determinants of the extent of policy radicalness.
１．Introduction
 
We often observe that politicians adopt unpopular policies in democracies. Some of
 
recent examples are the privatization of public enterprises by Margaret Thatcher in the
 
United Kingdom,the tax reform toward high-income class by Ronald Reagan in the United
 
States,the introduction of consumption tax by Noboru Takeshita(and the subsequent rise
 
in the tax rate by Ryutaro Hashimoto)in Japan,and the rapid transition from socialism to
 
market economy by Boris Yeltsin in Russia. These policies are“radical”in the sense that
 
politicians position themselves far from a centrist political opinion at the time of policy
 
adoption.
The observations appear to be puzzling because,in democracies,there is a possibility
 
of alternation in office and hence politicians must seek popularity of the electorate in order
 
to win election.
Why do politicians risk on radical policies? In this paper,we argue that the adoption
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of radical policy can be interpreted as the politicians’attempt to create fact. Specifically,
this paper focuses on two key elements behind the adoption of radical policy:the uncer-
tainty in electoral outcome and the cost of policy change.
The mechanism can be explained as follows. Due to the electoral uncertainty,with
 
positive probability an incumbent will lose power in the future and a challenger will get
 
position to choose a future policy. Anticipating this possibility,the incumbent attempts to
 
reduce a challenger’s discretionary power in policymaking and to take control over future
 
policy while he stays in office. If the incumbent adopts a moderate policy,the cost of policy
 
change by the challenger will not so high. Hence,the challenger will more easily overthrow
 
the incumbent’s policy choice and make a costly policy change in the future if taking over
 
office. Meanwhile, if the incumbent adopts a radical policy, the challenger will prefer
 
avoiding a high cost of policy change and be likely to continue adopting the incumbent’s
 
policy. Therefore,the adoption of radical policy today is rationalized from the incumbent’s
 
standpoint,since it can make a policy in the future favorable to the incumbent even if the
 
incumbent will lose office. As is clear from this discussion, contrary to the standard
 
intuition, the adoption of radical policy considered in this paper can arise from the
 
possibility of alternation in office in democracies,but not despite it.
In previous researches,several articles studied the effects of electoral uncertainty on
 
the nature of policy adopted by the incumbent. Persson and Svensson (1989)showed that
 
a conservative incumbent may run a fiscal deficit in order to limit the fiscal expansion by
 
the liberal challenger. Similarly,Tabellini and Alesina (1990)argued that when there is a
 
difference in preference over public goods among political parties, the balanced-budget
 
fiscal policies do not constitute a political equilibrium. Cukierman,Edwards,and Tabellini
(1992)identified the adoption of inefficient tax schemes as politicians’rational response to
 
political instability. Glazer (1989)argued that public investment is biased toward durable
 
projects because durability implies a lasting influence of the incumbent on the future.(See,
for an extensive survey, Persson and Tabellini, 2000.)However, those articles consider
 
special situations around the determination of fiscal policies and do not relate the results
 
to the radical-moderate dimension of policy choice. The present paper hence shows that
 
their results have more general insight and application beyond the situations specific to
 
fiscal politics.
The rest of paper is organized as follows. The next section explains the setup of the
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model. Section 3 solves the equilibrium of the model and shows that electoral uncertainty
 
leads an incumbent politician to adopt a radical policy. Section 4 implements some
 
comparative statics in order to discuss the determinants of the extent of radicalness of
 
policy. Section 5 offers some concluding remarks.
２．Model
 
Consider a two-period game with two political parties,L and R.In period 1,party L is
 
the incumbent and makes a one-dimentional policy choice,x . An election is held at the end
 
of period 1. With probability p,party L wins the election,whereas with probability 1－p,
party R wins the election. This electoral uncertainty is assumed to reflect random shifts
 
in electorate’s preference. In period 2, the winner chooses a policy x (I＝L,R). It is
 
assumed that continuing a policy(x＝x )imposes no costs on the party in office;however,
changing a policy(x≠x )requires the effort exerted by the party in office. The effort cost
 
takes a form of c x －x ,where c is a positive constant. Here,it is naturally assumed
 
that when the party in office changes a policy,with more distance between the period 1’s
 
policy and period 2’s policy,the effort cost is larger.
Party L’s payoff depends on the policies adopted in period 1 and period 2 and on the cost
 
of a policy change. The payoff function is expressed as :
U ＝－ x －y －p x －y ＋c x －x － 1－p x －y , 1
where y is party L’s bliss point.
Similarly,party R’s payoff function is expressed as :
U ＝－ x －y －p x －y － 1－p x －y ＋c x －x , 2
where y is party R’s bliss point.
Without loss of generality,it is assumed that－∞＜y＜y＜∞. That is,party L has the
 
bliss point to the left of that of party R.Then we say that the policy is radical if x ＜y＜
y .
１）Another strand of literature that considered the relation of electoral uncertainty to the incumbent’s
 
policy manipulations takes the opposite view that politicians are office-motivated. Aghion and
 
Bolton (1990)showed that a conservative incumbent may run a fiscal deficit in order to limit the
 
probability of winning election of the liberal challenger who prefer further expansion of fiscal policy
(see also Milesi-Ferretti and Spolaore,1994;Milesi-Ferretti,1995). Specifically,Glazer,Gradstein
 
and Konrad (1998) obtained an interesting prediction that if politicians are sufficiently office-




The equilibrium of the model can be solved by backward induction. Consider first the
 
sub-games in period 2. Suppose that party L wins the election at the end of period 1. Party
 
L,given period 1’s policy choice x ,chooses x to maximize:
－ x －y －c x －x . 3





Next suppose that party R is in office in period 2. Similarly,given period 1’s policy
 
choice x ,party R chooses x to maximize:
－ x －y －c x －x , 5





Now consider the game in period 1. In period 1,party L chooses x to maximize U ,
subject to 4 and 6 ,i.e.taking into account the reaction of period 2’s party in office to
 
period 1’s policy choice. Thus,the following maximization problem gives the equilibrium
 
choice of policy in period 1:
maxU ＝－ x －y －p x x －y ＋c x －x x － 1－p x x －y . 7






Proposition 1. The policy adopted by the incumbent is radical,x ＜y＜y ,if the uncer-
tainty in electoral outcome and the cost of policy change exist.
Proof. Since we have assumed that y＜y ,Φ＞0 if p＜1 and c＞0. Therefore,x ＜y＜
y
Corollary. x ＜x ＜y and y＜x ＜
y＋cy
1＋c
＜y if p＜1 and c＞0.
Facing the electoral uncertainty,the incumbent wants to retain control over the future
 
policy even when losing office. To this end,he/she adopts a radical policy that is harder
― ―36
 
to change. In words,Proposition 1 states that the incumbent finds it optimal to create fact
 
by adopting a radical policy.
４．Determinants of policy radicalness
 
Under what circumstances,is the adopted policy likely to be more radical? Proposition
 
1 shows that Φparameterizes the extent of policy radicalness. Hence this section offers
 
some comparative statics results about Φ,and discusses the determination of the policy
 
radicalness.
To make intuition underlying the results clear,let us first summarize the loss and gain
 
of policy radicalness for the incumbent (see again Eq. 7). The loss is:the cost of policy
 
deviation from the incumbent’s bliss point in the present;the cost of policy deviation and
 
that of policy change when the incumbent will win office in the future(with probability p).
The gain is:the benefit of less policy deviation from the incumbent’s bliss point when the
 
challenger will take over office in the future(with probability 1－p). If the loss is small
 
relative to the gain,the incumbent naturally adopts a more radical policy.
・The ideological polarization
 
First, let us consider how the magnitude of the ideological difference between the
 







Proposition 2a. The policy adopted by the incumbent is more radical,as the ideological
 
positions of the incumbent and the challenger is more polarized.
The intuition for this result is the following. When the ideological positions are more
 
polarized, the challenger has a strong incentive to implement a larger policy change if
 
taking over office. Anticipating this, the incumbent adopts a more radical policy while
 
being in office,in order to minimize the adverse effect of such a future policy change. In
 
words,the ideological polarization increases the gain of radical policy,but keeps the loss
 




Next,let us take up the effect of the magnitude of electoral uncertainty on the extent
 




－y c 1＋c 1＋2c
1＋c ＋pc＋c
＜0. 10
Proposition 2b. The policy adopted by the incumbent is more radical, as the electoral
 
uncertainty increases.
In this case,the balance of loss and gain from policy radicalness changes as follows. A rise
 
in the probability of the challenger in office decreases the relative weight attached to the
 
cost of the incumbent in office in the future but increases that attached to the benefit of
 
restricting the challenger’s future policy deviation. Hence, the electoral uncertainty
 
increases the gain of radical policy,but decreases the loss. As a result, the incumbent
 
adopts a more radical policy even at the sacrifice of present policy preference.
・The cost of policy change
 
Finally, let us discuss how an increased cost of policy change affects the extent of
 











Proposition 2c. The policy adopted by the incumbent is more radical as the cost of policy
 
change increases if the cost is small,but it is less radical if the cost is large.
The mechanism behind this experiment is somewhat complex. A rise in the cost of policy
 
change increases not only the cost of future policy change by the incumbent,but also the
 
benefit of less future policy deviation when the challenger will be in office. Notice,
however,that the restriction of policy change also increases the cost of policy deviation in
 
the future when the incumbent will be in office. Hence,when the cost of policy change is
 
small,the gain dominates the loss,and then the incumbent finds it optimal to adopt a more
 
radical policy even at the expense of present and future policy preference;meanwhile,
when the cost of policy change is large,the opposite is true,and therefore the incumbent
 




This paper has demonstrated that the observed adoption of radical(and hence unpopu-
lar)policies in democracies can be caused by the incumbent politicians’attempts to create
 
fact.
Finally, let us briefly discuss the effects of such an attempt in the real world. The
 
Economist (November 2,1996)argued,“Clinton governs like a Republican.”This story can
 
be interpreted as that given the fact created by the Reagan-Bush Republican administration
 
in 1980s,the Clinton administration implemented policies that lean toward the Republican
 
and depart from the traditional Democrat in 1990s.
Examples may also include the“Third Way”by Tony Brair in the United Kingdom,the
(failed)National Welfare Tax Plan by Morihiro Hosokawa in Japan,and the“Realism”of
 
Vladimir Putin in Russia. Although I do not intend to offer a specific explanation for the
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